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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown astonishingly fast,
even faster than international trade. Not only did the overall level of FDI
increase, it also changed from investments in manufacturing to investment in
services. Related to these, intra-firm trade of business services such as engi-
neering, consulting, and software development, which do not require physical
shipments of products, have been playing major roles in today’s world trade.
Reducing cost by FDI has become much more feasible with the availability
of the global high-bandwidth network infrastructure.
According to these changes, new types of FDI and service trade which
are taking advantage of time zone differences between countries emerge. The
semiconductor industry provides a prime example. Brown and Linden (2009,
pp. 87–91) wrote:
“Some chip companies with foreign design subsidiaries value the
opportunity to design on a 24-hour cycle because of the enor-
mous pressure to reach the market ahead of, or no later than,
competitors. One established US chip company adopted a rolling
cycle between design centers in the United States, Europe, and
India. More common is the bi-national arrangement used by a
Silicon Valley start-up that had all of its design beyond the ini-
tial specification done by a China subsidiary established within
months of the company’s founding.... The Silicon Valley staff
would review Beijing’s work from the previous day, then spend
up to three hours on the phone (stating around 5 pm California
time) providing feedback and reviewing assignments for that day
in Beijing. In a single-location firm this work-feedback cycle take
2
two days instead of one.”
Not only firms, but also consumers prefer to consume services taking ad-
vantage of time zone differences. Ireland, pitching to host Europe’s main
international call centers, offers another example. Cairncross (1997, p. 219)
emphasized the rise of the call-center service industry in Ireland, which is
taking geographical advantage of being in between the U.S. and Europe.
To summarize above arguments, due to the communications revolution,
time zone differences may become a primary driving force behind service
trade. Furthermore, these kinds of service trade invite new types of incentives
for FDI. From home consumers’/firm’s viewpoints, it is preferable that some
subsidiaries locate at distant areas to serve for home market. Although
this point is at odds with the “proximity advantages” of FDI (e.g., Brainard,
1997), it seems to be important to consider these new types of FDI incentives.
Related to these phenomena, Marjit (2007) examined the role of international
time zone differences in a vertically integrated Ricardian framework. It has
been shown that time zone differences emerge as an independent driving force
of international trade besides taste, technology and resource endowment.1
What remains unanswered is what is the relationship between firm-productivity
and FDI with time zone difference. Based on casual empiricism, we believe
that time-saving technological improvement (e.g., utilization of communica-
tions networks such as the Internet) can trigger a series of events that leads
to reallocations of industry structure via FDI. In the existing literature on
1Jones et al. (2005) also emphasize the role of time zone differences as a determinant
of efficient worldwide division of labor. Furthermore, the fragmentation of production
stages and of service provision has been studied within a static trade-theoretic framework
by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), Grossman and Helpman (2005), Long, Riezman and
Soubeyran (2005), Do and Long (2008).
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FDI and firm heterogeneity, however, relatively few attempts have been made
to address the role of time zone differences on FDI decisions.2 This seems
to suggest that the focus on “trade using different time zones” should be
accompanied by a focus on firms’ FDI decisions. The main purpose of this
study is to illustrate, with simple FDI model with heterogeneous firms, how
a time-saving improvement in service trade using different time zones can
have a huge impact on firms’ FDI decisions.
For these purposes, based on Helpman et al. (2004), we propose a simple
two-country model with heterogeneous firms that capture the role of FDI
via utilizing time zone differences. Two countries (Home and Foreign) are
assumed to be located in different time zones and there is no overlap in
daily working hours. The key assumption of our model is that domestic
service production requires one workday and that products are ready for
sale after one workday: domestic delivery bears significant costs in terms
of delay. In contrast to this, the utilization of communications networks
allows production in a foreign country where non-overlapping work hours
and service trade via networks enable a quick delivery and low shipping costs.
In other words, imported services whose production benefits from time zone
differences provide higher value than domestically produced services.
Based on the model outlined above, this study shows productivities of
the firms undertaking FDI are higher than the productivities of non-FDI
firms. Although the results look quite similar with Helpman et al. (2004),
the direction of service trade flow is totally different: Foreign subsidiaries
2In their important contribution, Helpman et al. (2004) show that the productivities
of the firms undertaking FDI are higher than the productivity of the exporters. According
to this point, Mukherjee (2010) show that the theoretical prediction of Helpman et al.
(2004) may not hold. Helpman (2006) provided an excellent survey on the literature on
FDI with heterogeneous firms.
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of high-productivity firms provide services for the Home market. In other
words, in a sense of timeliness, building Foreign subsidiaries via FDI implies
building subsidiaries closer to the Home market (see, Figure 1).
2 The Model
Suppose there are two countries, Home and Foreign, which are endowed with
one factor of production (labor). They are located in different time zones and
there is no overlap in daily working hours: when Home’s daytime working
hours end, Foreign daytime working hours begin (Figure 1).
There are two types of goods: a homogeneous good and a large variety
of differentiated services. Only Home consumers demand the differentiated
services, while both countries’ consumers demand the homogeneous good.
The preference of the representative Home consumer are given by
u = (1− β) log z + β
α
log
(∫
v
[x(v)]αdv
)
, (1)
where z is consumption of the homogeneous good, x(v) is consumption of
variety v, α = (² − 1)/², ² > 1 is an elasticity of substitution between
varieties. These preferences imply the following demand function,
x(v) = A[p(v)]−², (2)
A =
βE∫ n
0
[p(v)]1−²dv
, (3)
where E is the aggregate level of spending in Home, n is the measure of
service varieties available in Home, and p(v) is the consumer price of variety
v.
The homogeneous good is produced with constant returns, using labor as
an input. Units are chosen so that one unit of labor produces one unit of
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output. As usual, no transport costs exist for the homogeneous good, which
serves to tie down the wage rate. Also assume that the parameters of the
model are such that both countries produce the homogeneous good; thus,
constant, identical wages hold (hereafter set to unity).
Now let us turn to the differentiated service sector. To simplify the anal-
ysis, we assume that the difference service firms exist only in Home. To enter
the industry, a firm bears the fixed costs of entry fE, measured in labor units.
An entrant then draws a labor-per-unit-output coefficient a from a distribu-
tion G(a). Upon observing this draw, a firm may decide to exit and not
produce. If it choose to produce domestically, however, it bears additional
fixed overhead labor costs fD. On the other hand, if it chooses to serve the
domestic (Home) market via foreign direct investment (FDI), it bears addi-
tional fixed costs fI (e.g., build up communications networks between two
countries). We assume
fI > fD. (4)
The key assumption is that domestic production requires one workday and
that service products are ready for sale after one workday: the delivery of
domestic products involves significant costs in terms of delay. In contrast to
this, the utilization of communications networks (i.e., FDI) allows production
in a foreign country where non-overlapping work hours and trade via networks
enable quick delivery and low shipping costs. For these reasons, imported
service products whose production benefits from time zone differences provide
higher value than domestically produced services.
In order to capture this point, we assume that shipments of products incur
the “iceberg” effect of delivery costs: to sell one unit of Foreign products in
the Home market, τ units must be shipped. Thus, the price of Foreign
services becomes τ times higher than its original price. One can interpret τ
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as a measure of the inverse of the “delivery timeliness” of Foreign products
in the Home market: a lower value of τ implies a quicker delivery.
As mentioned above, domestic production are ready for sale after one
workday, whereas imported services whose production benefits from time
zone differences are available sooner (see Figure 1). To parametarize the
timing of delivery, we treat the utilization of communications networks (i.e.,
technological improvement) as a reduction in the delivery time of imported
products (i.e., a decrease in τ). Let us denote the Foreign services’ delivery
timeliness before technological change as τ1 and that after change as τ2. Then
the following condition holds:
τ1 > 1 > τ2. (5)
Note that this effect comes not from lower production costs in Foreign, but
from faster delivery. In other words, in a sense of timeliness, building Foreign
subsidiaries via FDI implies building subsidiaries closer to the Home market
(see, Figure 1).
As noted above, preferences (1) generate a demand function Ap−² for
every brand of the service products, where the demand level A is exogenous
from the point of view of the individual supplier. In this case, the brand of a
monopolistic producer with labor coefficient a is offered for sale at the price
p = a/α, where 1/α represents the markup factor. As a result, the effective
consumer price is a/α for domestically produced services, and is τia/α for
imported services.
Operating profits from domestic production are
piD = a
1−²B − fD, (6)
B =
(1− α)A
α1−²
, (7)
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for a firm with a labor-output coefficient a.
On the other hand, the operating profits from FDI (serving Home market
via communications network) are
piIi = (τia)
1−²B − fI , i = 1, 2 (8)
These profit functions are depicted in Figure 2. In this figure, a1−² is repre-
sented on the horizontal axis. Since ² > 1, this variable increases monotoni-
cally with labor productivity 1/a, and can be used as a productivity index.
Two profit functions are increasing linear functions of this index. More pro-
ductive firms are therefore more profitable in all two activities.
The least productive firms expect negative operating profits and therefore
exit the industry. This fate befalls all frims with productivity levels below
(aD)
1−². The slope of piI equals (τi)
1−²B, i = 1, 2, which depends on the
technological condition of communications networks (see (5)). When τ1 > 1,
FDI is always unprofitable (a dotted line). If τ2 < 1, firms with productiv-
ity above (aI)
1−² gain more from FDI. For this reason, given that τ2 < 1,
firms with productivity levels between (aD)
1−² and (aI)
1−² choose domestic
production while those with higher levels build subsidiaries in Foreign and
produce Foreign services. In other words, via time-saving technological im-
provement, firms with higher productivity begin to build Foreign subsidiaries.
The (fixed) costs of building Foreign subsidiaries can be offset by a lower de-
livery (time) costs of services.
Proposition 1: Given that τ2 < 1, firms with higher productivity choose to
FDI and provide Foreign services for Home market.
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It is evident from the figure that the cutoff coefficients are determined by
(aD)
1−²B = fD, (9)
[(τ2)
1−² − 1](aI)1−²B = fI − fD. (10)
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating profits of a po-
tential entrant and the entry costs fE. This condition can be expressed as
[((τ2)
1−² − 1)V (aI) + V (aD)] B
− [G(aI)(fI − fD) +G(aDfD)] = fE,(11)
V (a) =
∫ a
0
y1−²dG(y). (12)
Equations (9)− (11) provide implicit solutions for the cutoff coefficients aD,
aI , and the demand level B.
Combining (9) and (10), the following must be hold:
aD
aI
= τ2
(
fI − fD
fD
)(
1
τ 1−²2 − 1
)1/(²−1)
. (13)
From (13), we can obtain the ratio of domestic production relative to FDI
sales:
sD
sI
=
∫ aD
aI
a1−²B∫ aI
0
(τ2a)
1−² = (τ2)
²−1
[
V (aD)
V (aI)
− 1
]
. (14)
3 Comparative Statics
In order to explore the effects of productivity dispersion on the ratio sD/sI ,
we parametarize V (a) by parametarizing the distribution G(a). For exposi-
tional purposes, let us use a Pareto distribution with the shape parameter
k.3 Then, we can obtain
V (a) =
∫ a
0
y1−²dG(y) = cak−(²−1), (15)
3See, for example, Helpman et al. (2003, 2004).
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where c is constant and it is assumed that k > ² + 1 Plugging back in (14),
we can obtain
sD
sI
= (τ2)
²−1
[(
fI − fD
fD
1
τ21−² − 1
) k−(²−1)
²−1
− 1
]
. (16)
It is then straightforward to see that the ratio of domestic production to FDI
is decreasing in delivery timeliness of imported services. It also decreasing in
productivity dispersion, as parametrized by lower k.
Proposition 2: A decrease in one country’s delivery costs for imported
services decreases the relative sales of domestic production. Also, an increase
in productivity dispersion decreases the relative share of domestic production.
Let us suppose that Home is a developed country, while Foreign is a
developing country. Our result suggests that a time-saving technological
change improvement in the developed country, which then requires more
services provided with the benefit of time zone differences, triggers high-
productivity firms’ FDI toward the developing country. Jones and Marjit
(2001) argue that, in a world in which the costs of service links are falling
drastically, fragmentation of production process offers new opportunities to
developing countries. The present result on FDI with high-productivity firms
provide some theoretical grounds for such a development process.
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